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Abstract
The current ‘fake news’ phenomenon is a modern manifestation of  something that has existed throughout
history. The difference between what happens now and what has happened before is driven by the nature of
the internet and social media – and Facebook in particular. Three key strands of  Facebook’s business model
– invading privacy to profile individuals, analysing mass data to profile groups, then algorithmically curating
content and targeting individuals and groups for advertising – create a perfect environment for fake news.
Proposals to ‘deal’ with fake news either focus on symptoms or embed us further in the algorithms that create
the problem. Whilst we embrace social media, particularly as a route to news, there is little that can be done
to reduce the impact of  fake news and misinformation. The question is whether the benefits to freedom of
expression that social media brings mean that this is a price worth paying.
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1 Fake news
On 3 November 2016, Craig Silverman and Lawrence Alexander wrote a piece forBuzzfeed, identifying ‘more than 100 pro-Trump websites being run from a single
town in the former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia’.2 Their headline read ‘How teens in
the Balkans are duping Trump supporters with fake news’. This appears to have been the
first time the words ‘fake news’ were used – but the phenomenon that it illustrates is
something that has existed for a very long time, perhaps as long as history itself.3 Silverman
and Alexander’s story covered one very specific form of  fake news – websites that
purported to be US news and political websites providing information and analysis, but
were in fact created in Macedonia and full of  stories that, in essence, were not true. The
Macedonian teens were doing it entirely for financial gain – they had quickly discovered that
they could make advertising money through Google AdSense because of  the numbers of
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1     Dr Paul Bernal, Senior Lecturer in IT, IP and Media Law, UEA Law School.
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3     Herodotus, known as the ‘father of  history’ is also known as the ‘father of  lies’ (see e.g. J A  S Evans, ‘Father
of  history or father of  lies: the reputation of  Herodotus’ (1968) 64(1) The Classical Journal 11–17). Fake news
may be even older: there is no real reason to believe that misinformation, disinformation and other
phenomena related to ‘fake news’ did not occur in prehistory, and plenty of  reason to believe that they would
have. 
people visiting their sites. Their ‘fake news’ was popular and successful – and its success
provided a number of  clues to why the age-old problem of  misinformation had gained a
new and spectacular lease of  life. Those clues need to be understood by those who wish to
do something against ‘fake news’ – because they were understood by those who wished to
harness its effects and effectiveness. Fake news moved from being a small nuisance, a few
Macedonian teenagers making money, to something that might have the potential to aid in
the undermining of  democracy in many places around the world.
A large part of  why this is the case relates to the way that the social media – and
Facebook in particular – functions. Though, as shall be shown, fake news has existed for
a very long time, with varying degrees of  success, the ‘new world’ of  social media is
ideally suited to its propagation and effectiveness, bringing it to a whole new level. Many
different aspects of  Facebook in particular contribute to this: the aggregation and analysis
of  data, the profiling and the targeting. These start with the ‘natural’ tendencies of  the
internet towards polarisation, where ‘like-minded’ people come together, act as echo
chambers and reinforcers – as noted by Sunstein as early as 2001,4 and taken further by
Bernal and Pariser in 2010 and 2011 respectively, through the concepts of  ‘back-door
Balkanisation’ and ‘filter bubbles’5 – and magnifies and builds upon them. There are both
‘automatic’ phenomena – a tendency for fake news to spread by its nature and the
structures of  social media – and deliberately instigated phenomena through which
malicious actors can cause fake news to spread for their own purposes, whether these be
political, for financial gain (as for the Macedonian teenagers) or simply out of  amusement
(as for some of  the original ‘trickster’ internet trolls).6
The way that these phenomena are supported and, in some ways, driven by some of
the fundamental aspects of  Facebook and other social media means that the current
attempts to address the fake news problem are highly unlikely to be successful in any
meaningful way. Most address the fake news itself  rather than the way that it is spread or
the reasons it is effective – and as fake news has always existed and has become
remarkably easy to create, particularly in the social media, this is likely to be at best a futile
game of  whack-a-mole.
If  the problems of  fake news are really to be addressed, something more fundamental
needs to happen. Either the way we use social media has to change – most importantly
the use of  Facebook and similar social media as a source of  news – or the structure and
business models of  social media have to change fundamentally. The first seems unlikely;
the second all-but impossible, as without data analysis, profiling and targeting it is hard to
see a business model for Facebook and other social media enterprises. Whilst Facebook
and similar social media exist, there will be a problem with fake news – and as the public
seems to have little appetite for leaving Facebook, that means that the problems
associated with fake news are just going to grow, no matter what lawmakers and
technologists try to do about them.
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4     In Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton University Press 2001) and further developed in Cass Sunstein,
Republic.com 2.0 (Princeton University Press 2007).
5     ‘Back-door Balkanisation’ is discussed in P A Bernal, ‘Web 2.5: the symbiotic web’ (2010) 24 (1) International
Review of  Law, Computers and Technology 25–37, and ‘filter bubbles’ in Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What
The Internet is Hiding from You (Viking 2011). It should be noted that there has been some questioning of  the
polarisation effects – see e.g. L Boxell, M Gentzkow and J M Shapiro ‘Is the internet causing political
polarization? Evidence from demographics’ (NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 23258, 2017)
<www.nber.org/papers/w23258>.
6     See P A Bernal, The Internet, Warts and All: Free Speech, Privacy and Truth (Cambridge University Press 2018), ch 8,
particularly 196–9.
1.1 WHAT IS FAKE NEWS?
The concept of  ‘fake news’ is somewhat nebulous: a precise definition is neither easy nor
necessarily useful. Journalist Matthew D’Ancona defined fake news as ‘the deliberate
presentation of  falsehood as fact’7 which captures the ‘fakeness’ but not necessarily the
‘news’ part of  the concept. What characterised the stories of  the Macedonian teenagers
was in part that they were presented as though they were conventional – ‘real’ – news, on
sites that looked like news sites. Fake news in its purest form is not just falsehoods
pretending to be true (essentially just lies), but falsehoods presenting themselves as both
real and ‘news’, in the sense that they are new, relevant and important enough to be
‘newsworthy’.
The nature of  how we now consume news means that fake news does not necessarily
have to be presented that way. A Facebook page or even a tweet could count – so long as
the Facebook page or tweet was both ‘fake’ and ‘news’. Tweeting something untrue about
what you had for breakfast would not count, for example, but tweeting that you saw a
politician in a compromising situation could: it would be newsworthy. Similarly, YouTube
videos taking footage of  one event and labelling it as another – a protest march in one
country at one time presented as coming from another country at another time,
protesting about something quite different – would count as fake news. 
Concentrating on what exactly constitutes ‘fake news’, however, misses much of  the
point. The European Commission’s ‘independent High Level Group on fake news and
online disinformation’8 gets part of  the way to seeing this. ‘The threat is disinformation,
not fake news’ is the headline in its ‘problem definition’ section. It goes on to say that ‘the
term is inadequate to capture the complex problem of  disinformation, which involves
content that is not actually or completely “fake” but fabricated information blended with
facts’ and that this includes ‘practices that go well beyond anything resembling “news” to
include some forms of  automated accounts used for astroturfing, networks of  fake
followers, fabricated or manipulated videos, targeted advertising, organized trolling, visual
memes, and much more’.9
Whilst the High Level Group is right that the fake news itself  is not the real problem
– and that it has always existed – and right that what might be called the disinformation
campaigns use a wide range of  tactics, it does not look in any depth into the role that the
systems and business practices of  the social media play in this. The disinformation
campaigns are not accidents or exceptions, nor are they the result of  rogues misusing
systems in a way that they were not intended, but are a ‘natural’ extension of  the way that
those systems are designed. Data analysis, profiling and targeting in order to persuade and
manipulate is precisely the way that Facebook in particular works. 
1.2 FAKE NARRATIVES
What is also missed in most discussions of  fake news – and in the High Level Group’s
report – is the role of  the conventional media and of  what might loosely be described as
‘mainstream’ politicians in disinformation. In particular, in pushing fake narratives.10
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D’Ancona, Post Truth: The New War on Truth and How to Fight Back (Ebury Press 2017).
8     European Commission HLEG, A Multi-dimensional Approach to Disinformation (Report of  the Independent High
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9     Ibid 11.
10   See Bernal (n 6) ch 9, 234–9.
Disinformation is not just about individual facts being false, but about the interpretation or
analysis of  those facts being used to draw false conclusions, to paint false pictures and thus
to persuade people to make decisions that have very different effects to the ones they think.
This is not something new: it is a classical tactic of  both politics and the media to
persuade people to vote against their own interests and in favour of  the interests of  the
politicians or their backers. The misinformation campaigns run on the internet can feed
from and at the same time bolster similar campaigns in the conventional media, driven by
conventional politicians. In the UK, for example, the idea that immigration is damaging
to the economy and to jobs, and a drain on the health service and the welfare system,
though contradicted by substantially all the empirical and academic evidence,11 has been
pushed for many years by both the media and politicians. That ‘immigration is damaging’
narrative can then be exaggerated and spread through the online disinformation
campaigns – and indeed spread automatically by the social media’s polarisation
tendencies.12
For the purposes of  spreading a fake narrative, it is not just the clearly fake news that
can have the effect. ‘Real’ news that fits the same narrative would work just as well, as
would information that is neither entirely real nor entirely fake. This mirrors the
difference between lying and bullshitting, as memorably set out in philosopher Harry
Frankfurt’s essay On Bullshit.13 To Frankfurt, lying is saying something you know to be
false, while bullshitting is not caring – and perhaps not even knowing – whether what you
say is true or false. Those spreading fake narratives are, in Frankfurt’s terms, bullshitters,
whilst those spreading straightforward fake news are liars. As Frankfurt notes, ‘bullshit is
a greater enemy of  the truth than lies are’,14 as those spreading it have no regard for the
truth at all. In practical terms it is easier to oppose fake news than fake narratives. Facts
can be disproven, perpetrators of  lies challenged through laws from fraud to defamation.
Narratives, as interpretations of  facts, are more like opinions – given much more
protection under freedom of  speech laws, and quite rightly so. In terms of  political
manipulation, however, they may be every bit as damaging. 
1.3 HISTORICAL FAKE NEWS
Though fake news is presented as something ‘new’, there have been forms of  it
throughout history. Making up stories about current events, or about particular people or
groups of  people, and using whatever was the most popular or effective method of
spreading those stories at the time, appears a ‘natural’ thing to do if  you want to persuade
people to do something. Using this approach to writing history, for example, has a long
history itself. The twelfth-century monk Geoffrey of  Monmouth’s ‘The History of  the
Kings of  Britain’ which claimed to trace the lineage of  Britons to the Trojan Aeneas,
included the mythical King Arthur, creating a narrative of  ancient nobility and glory to
support his current masters. Evidence to support this narrative was not the point: the
effect on the events of  the time was.
A closer parallel to the current fake news phenomenon comes from the fifteenth
century and the case of  Vlad Tepeş: Vlad the Impaler.15 Vlad, the ruler of  the Principality
of  Wallachia, in current-day Romania, made a large number of  enemies through his
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11   See <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/immigration-demons-and-academic-evidence>.
12   See Section 2.3 below.
13   Harry G Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton University Press 2005).
14   Ibid 55.
15   More details of  this story can be found in Bernal (n 6) ch 9, 231–4.
various political activities and actions, and those enemies sought to blacken his name at
the time, and his memory after he was dead – to damage his image as a hero to many of
the people of  the principality. The narrative they created was that of  Vlad as a vicious,
evil and almost demonic figure. The means they used were those current at the time –
from manuscripts in Russian Orthodox monasteries and chronicles in the court of  the
Turkish sultan to records written for the then King of  Hungary, Matthias Corvinus. The
most interesting and most relevant to the current ‘fake news’ issues was a series of
pamphlets prepared by ethnic Germans in the region, between 1488 and 1530. These
were particularly gruesome, illustrated with graphic woodcuts. One notable example
depicted Vlad eating his dinner with a smile on his face, many people impaled on long
sticks in front of  him as he ate. Did he actually eat dinner, surrounded by his victims? Was
he actually more brutal than other rulers of  the times? The facts did not really matter to
those presenting them – and when examined by historians from this distance, it appears
he was not that remarkable in his brutality but an effective leader and warrior:
Vlad was a man of  his times – a capable leader, driven by clear objectives, yet
flawed, as men are. Had he been the degenerate, inhuman creature that some
have transformed him into, Dracula would never have regained his throne in
1476, supported by the Christian leaders of  Southeastern Europe. Unfortunately,
the propaganda of  the time distorted the image of  this brave prince whose role
in history deserves reconsideration.16
The truth of  the details was not important to the German creators and distributors of
the pamphlets. They had a narrative to support, a story to spread, and they used the
methods of  the time. Pamphlets distributed by hand, with graphic images to help those
who could not read, were as good and quick a method of  spreading a story as was
available at the time: the Facebook pages of  the fifteenth century. They reached the
communities the creators wanted them to reach, in the Saxon towns in Wallachia and
Transylvania, provided them with ammunition to push the ideas they supported, the
‘facts’ to ‘prove’ that they were right about Vlad. The pamphlets were part of  a bigger
phenomenon – one that worked so well that though the facts of  his history are known by
very few, ‘Vlad the Impaler’ is well ‘known’ as one of  the worst villains in history and a
byword for brutality.
In a similar way, Richard III had his name thoroughly blackened by Tudor propaganda
– the relationship between fake news and propaganda is very close – most directly
through Shakespeare’s memorable play. Oliver Cromwell’s reputation was attacked by
restoration royalists in amongst other things ‘hostile biographies, written just after the
Restoration, which gleefully printed invented, scandalous stories about him in order to
blacken his character’.17 In seventeenth-century France, misinformation was spread using
pamphlets called affiches and tiny billets – card-sized reports that could easily be concealed
and then discarded, or sung or spoken by roaming colporteurs. As historian Linda Kiernan
describes it:
News was relayed (and redrafted) often by word of  mouth – the social media of
the age. Colporteurs peddled songs and stories on the streets, often scribbled
down on notes, or sung aloud to an already well-known tune. Making the
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17   Barry Coward, Cromwell: Profiles in Power (Pearson Education 1991) 7. Amongst other things, stories related to
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message memorable was half  the battle – the other half  could be covered by the
outlandish or scandalous nature of  the material.18
The nineteenth century demonstrates that, as in the current era, the motivation for those
producing and distributing fake news can be financial as well as the more obviously
manipulative. In Germany, a fashion grew for foreign news, driven by technological
developments from printing to the telegraph. To differentiate themselves from those
using standardised news agency reports, some sent foreign correspondents abroad, to give
first-hand reports and provide local details and colour. That cost money, and a new
strategy arose: the ‘unechte Korrespondenz’ or ‘fake foreign correspondent’s letter’.19 These
used techniques instantly recognisable to current creators and distributors of  fake news.
McGillen describes how one of  the most noted fake foreign correspondents, Theodor
Fontane, put together his report on London’s Tooley Street fire in 1861:
He had gleaned lots of  passages from older articles about the fire, partially
revised them, added a translated section from a current story in the London
Times, and had dressed it all up with a feigned first-person perspective and some
very creative additions, such as the ‘companion’ who had allegedly helped him
pass the police cordon.20
The point, as McGillen notes, is to fit in with the expectations of  the reader. Use familiar
ideas and images, match a narrative that the reader expects and perhaps supports, and add
colour and flavour to make it more attractive. It used the most readily available and
effective form of  communication of  the time – just as the enemies of  Vlad Tepeş had
used the most readily available forms of  their time. The motivations for the unechte
Korrespondenz were at least partially financial, just as those of  the Macedonian teens
identified by Silverman and Alexander were financial, but they also had a distinctly
political edge:
. . . false correspondences provided a steady trickle of  misinformation, with every
convincing false account – even those on ‘soft,’ non-political topics –
incrementally increasing the readers’ belief  in the overall trustworthiness and
competence of  a given newspaper. This steady work on a paper’s reputation, and
the gradual chipping away at the competence and credibility of  competing
papers, helped prepare the soil on which the less subtle propaganda messages
could flourish.21
As different media become more important and have bigger audiences and impacts, those
wishing to spread disinformation – including specifically fake news – embrace them and
adapt to them. William Joyce – Lord Haw-Haw – and the so-called Tokyo Roses – used
radio broadcasts in the Second World War, from Germany to the UK and Japan to the
USA respectively. Anna Wallis Suh – Seoul City Sue – and Trinh Thi Ngo – Hanoi
Hannah – did the same from North Korea and North Vietnam and to US troops in the
Korean and Vietnam wars respectively. Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf  – labelled as Comical
Ali – used television interviews during the 2003 war in Iraq. All used combinations of  fact
and fiction, weaving them together to support a particular narrative and have a political
effect. The medium chosen in each case was what was most easily available and most
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likely to have an effect. In the Second World War and for the troops in the Korean and
Vietnam wars, radio worked best. By the time of  the invasion of  Iraq, it was television.
In the current era, it is the social media that is both the most popular and the most likely
to have an effect.
2 Facebook
Facebook is not only one of  the fastest and most efficient forms of  communication
available, it is also tailor-made for the spreading of  fake news and for political
manipulation. It brings with it the largest possible audience – well over 2 billion people
are now on Facebook. It has also become a key place for accessing news. In 2017, the Pew
Research Center reported that 67 per cent of  Americans got at least some of  their news
from social media, whilst 68 per cent of  Facebook users used Facebook to access news.22
This is on the increase, and spreading amongst different and critical demographics: Pew
also report a notable increase in the use of  social media for news amongst older, non-
white and less educated people. In particular, Pew noted that 55 per cent of  Americans
over 50 reported getting their news from social media sites, an increase of  10 per cent
over the previous year. Pew’s data concerns Americans, but social media and Facebook in
particular are a major source of  news through much of  the world – including most of  the
key places for potential political manipulation.23
The audience is just the starting point. Just as Facebook combines many different
forms of  communication – from keeping families updated and friends sharing personal
updates to romance, job-searching and information-seeking, from the intimate to the
broadcast – it also combines all the key elements for the design, creation, targeting and
propagation of  fake news. 
There are lessons to learn from both the historical examples and the more recent
manifestations to show how this works. Firstly, that for fake news to be successful, it has
to have a potential audience. Secondly, that it has to match at least some of  the
expectations of  that audience. Thirdly, in terms of  measuring what constitutes success,
that it has to produce the results that the person creating or spreading the news desires.
That may mean producing a political or propaganda success – blackening the name of
Vlad the Impaler, Oliver Cromwell, Hillary Clinton or Jeremy Corbyn for example – or
generating income, as for the German fake foreign correspondents or the Macedonian
teens producing fake stories aiding Trump. 
2.1 CRAFTING FAKE NEWS ON FACEBOOK
Facebook not only aids those wishing to spread ‘fake news’, but provides them with tools
and incentives to do so. The starting point is the creation of  fake news. In the past this
was relatively difficult. Neither printing presses nor paper were cheap or easily available
until comparatively recently. They were often large and hard to conceal – government
censors could find dissident printers and destroy their presses. The stage-by-stage
technological developments, from commonly available computers to desktop publishing
to webpages to Facebook pages has made this progressively easier – mostly in ways
distinctly beneficial to freedom of  speech, but also enabling the production of  fake news.
With Facebook, this has reached a particular extreme: two Facebook pages look much like
each other, regardless of  whether they are made by a major news provider or a
Macedonian teenager. Making your ‘fake’ news look like the real thing has never been
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easier. Moreover, the costs involved are negligible – the technology is universal, Facebook
is ‘free’ to those using it to create pages, and distribution costs are minimal. 
Facebook also makes the crafting of  the content of  fake news easier – and this begins
the critical point about its business model. Facebook’s systems for data analysis and for
profiling create means for the advertisers (and fake news providers) to discover what
people are interested in – both in general terms, following large groups, and in specific
terms, profiling individuals. Given the mass of  people on Facebook and the mass of  data
provided by them, the opportunities for analysis are of  an unprecedented level and the
quality of  the profiling is improving all the time. As Kosinski et al revealed through their
2013 study,24 Facebook ‘likes’ in particular ‘can be used to automatically and accurately
predict a range of  highly sensitive personal attributes including: sexual orientation,
ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of
addictive substances, parental separation, age, and gender’. Specifically, their study was
remarkably accurate on race, sexuality and political views, discriminating between
‘homosexual and heterosexual men in 88% of  cases, African Americans and Caucasian
Americans in 95% of  cases, and between Democrat and Republican in 85% of  cases’.
This is not through explicit information about these subjects by the relevant people,
but through an analysis of  their likes, including the most mundane. When the study was
released, the headlines included that intelligence could be indicated by ‘liking’ curly fries,
and a lack of  intelligence by ‘liking’ motorcycles – the enormous amount of  data available
through Facebook allows seemingly random correlations to be found and used as
predictors, through mathematical analysis rather than psychological insight. The sheer
scale of  Facebook is what gives this its power. The more data that is available about a
population, the more easily traits can be determined. The more data that is available about
the population as a whole, the less data is needed about a particular individual in order to
profile and categorise them.
For the malicious crafter of  fake news this provides many benefits, but the point at this
stage is that it can be used to choose which issues to focus on within the stories. If  people
are worried about immigration, and about Eastern European immigration in particular,
and are worried by particular issues such as the use of  health services, then creating a story
about this is easy. Through the data-mining and analysis, Facebook can allow people to
identify the issues much more precisely than that. Perhaps specifying particular hospitals.
Perhaps finding that people are more worried about Bulgarians than Romanians, or Poles
rather than Czechs. Trying to make a story that is more likely to be believed and is also
more likely to persuade, starts with an analysis of  people’s existing beliefs.
2.2 DELIVERING FAKE NEWS VIA FACEBOOK
At the same time as enabling the creator of  fake news to find what kind of  fake news is
likely to attract an audience, it immediately helps the fake newsmonger to deliver that fake
news to precisely that audience. This would have been far harder even in the recent past:
finding people who share particular religious beliefs, for example, or views on politics,
was a challenge. Now it is a matter of  a few clicks. As noted above, very little mundane
information is needed on one particular individual in order to be able to make some
specific assessments in very much more intimate areas. In politics and fake news, just as
in advertising, it does not matter whether every ‘guess’ is accurate: it is a matter of  getting
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enough ‘hits’ to produce a result. The rates noted above for assessments of  race, sexuality
and political leanings are remarkably good in this context.
Facebook does not just help with identifying the potential audience but also provides
the mechanisms to target them – from the tools for advertisers to the various groups,
pages and so forth where they can be found. Paid political advertisements are only a small
part of  this – the spreading of  information in other ways is a critical part of  the way that
fake news works. Critically, much of  this happens without those behind the fake news
needing to take any action: Facebook’s whole ‘sharing’ system does much of  this
automatically. It is not just that the creators of  fake news are able to find an audience,
using tools provided by Facebook, but that the consumers of  fake news – willing and
aware or unwilling and unaware that what they are consuming is fake – are able to find
that fake news, also using tools provided by Facebook. ‘News’ tailored to individuals,
searching for news on particular subjects (using terms that the providers of  fake news will
know are likely to be searched for) and so forth all work in the same direction: to ensure
that what people are looking for is available to them, and that they can find it. Once
people have found the items of  fake news, they will share them – and Facebook’s social
network will ensure that it is spread without the creators of  the fake news having to do
any more about it: an electronic grapevine more effective than anything previously
imaginable, and one particularly suited to fake news, for a series of  reasons.
Perhaps most importantly, fake news can be more believable than ‘real’ news. It fits in
with people’s prejudices. This could be by design, for carefully crafted fake news, as noted
above. It could be because the person has been seeking out a particular kind of  news –
searching, for example for ‘Bulgarian immigrant crime’, when they have a preconception
that Bulgarian immigrants are committing a lot of  crime in the UK. It could also be
because Facebook – or Google, Twitter etc. – are pushing those kinds of  stories at the
people who are predisposed to believe them. Facebook has been tailoring its ‘news feed’
since it was introduced in 2006,25 and that tailoring has been based on Facebook’s
algorithmic assessment of  the individual’s preferences. This will automatically push stories
on the subjects that a person is interested in directly to that person. For the fake news
provider, this is perfect: create the fake news, and Facebook will push it to people
predisposed to sympathise with the message and indeed to believe the story. In turn,
those people will then share it with their own networks of  similar-minded people, transfer
it from Facebook onto their other social networks and so forth.
With fake news, ‘plot holes’ in stories can be plugged, consistency both internally and
with other fake news can be ensured – and as with the work of  Fontane, familiar and known
‘facts’ can be put in to help readers along. Well-known places, recognisable public figures
and so forth can be strategically placed to help the reader along. Things can be made more
dramatic or exciting than ‘real’ news, making people more likely to read and enjoy:
Fontane’s false correspondences at times simply provided the better stories in terms
of  their dramaturgy, aesthetic and intellectual appeal, and entertainment value.26
This makes fake news more likely to be believed and shared. There is empirical evidence to
support this, from more than one direction, that hits at the heart of  the way that
Facebook works, and the way that its business model works. What is also clear is that
Facebook knows this, and in some ways wants people to know this – because it both
commissioned and publicised some of  the research that demonstrates it.
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2.3 FAKE NEWS AND FACEBOOK’S MODEL
Facebook’s controversial ‘emotional contagion’ experiment from 2014 is perhaps the best
known.27 It involved the manipulation of  the news feeds of  689,003 Facebook users in
an attempt to manipulate their emotions. Through the use of  ‘sentiment analysis’, they
assessed whether items on people’s news feeds were happy, sad, or neither happy nor sad.
They then divided the group into three and manipulated their news feeds in an attempt
to influence their emotions. For one group, they promoted happy posts and suppressed
sad ones, for the second they promoted sad posts and suppressed happy ones, and for the
third they suppressed both happy and sad posts, leaving the posts without emotional
content prominent. Then, using a similar sentiment analysis on subsequent posts by the
users, they assessed whether this manipulation of  their news feeds had any effect on the
users’ emotions. The result that seemed to gather the most interest was that, to a
statistically significant degree, users whose feeds were made ‘happier’ became happier,
whilst those whose feeds were made ‘sadder’ became sadder. What was just as interesting,
however, was what happened to the third group, given feeds with less emotional content.
They engaged less with Facebook. For Facebook, that matters – and it means that
Facebook has a direct incentive to prioritise emotional over non-emotional content, and
not just in their news feed. It also suggests that users who receive more emotional
content, because they are more likely to engage, are also more likely to share that or
related content – and is part of  what supports the ‘automatic’ generation of  fake news
already mentioned and discussed further below. Facebook offered the academics who
performed this experiment ‘encouragement and support’.28 It is easy to see how the
dissemination of  this research is in Facebook’s interest: to be able to prove to advertisers
that you can have an emotional effect on your users is to demonstrate great power. 
The next piece of  research, that feeds directly into this, is Blaine and Boyer’s 2018
study that showed that people were more likely both to show interest in and to share and
spread rumours that contain threatening content.29 Further research shows that simply
‘reading a fake news headline once is sufficient to increase perceptions of  its accuracy’,30
whilst repeating a story makes it more likely to be believed.31 Facebook’s tailoring of  news
feeds according to interests plays into both of  these effects where interests fit with either
a fake narrative or a narrative being played upon by fake news providers. Combine this
with the way that communities of  like-minded people build on Facebook and other
similar social media and you have a ripe and ready environment for the automatic
spreading of  fake news and for the polarisation and generation of  extreme views. These
communities also become perfect places for the malicious actors who wish to spread their
fake news to ‘seed’. Plant an appropriately crafted story in the midst of  these
communities and they will spread it for you. As before, some of  them may be spreading
it whilst knowing that it is fake, because they know it will have the kind of  political impact
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not protect against illusory truth’ (2015) 144(5) Journal of  Experimental Psychology: General 993–1002. This
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they want to see, out of  a sense of  amusement or for some other reason. Many others,
however, will genuinely believe that the fake news is true because the fake news is
designed – effectively – to be believable specifically to people like them.
Another key concept comes into play here: astroturfing. Astroturf  is fake grass –
astroturfing, a term coined by Senator Lloyd Bentsen in relation to the activities of  PR
firms in the 1990s,32 is the creation of  a fake grassroots movement. This is particularly
easy on Facebook – using ‘fake people’ and fake pages to make it look as though there is
a big and important movement on the ground, though in reality it is not at all what it
seems, but something designed specifically to manipulate.
2.4 FINDING FAKE NEWS VIA FACEBOOK
Facebook does not just help those who wish to spread (fake) news, it helps those who
seek to find news. It provides a number of  different routes, some of  which have already
been noted from the other direction: ‘pushed’ personalised news through the news feed,
in a form designed to be as attractive as possible to the user and encouraging the user to
use their news feed more and more; the ‘social’ aspects of  the network – groups, pages,
networks of  ‘friends’ – as a route to news; the ‘friends’ themselves, whose ‘Mini Feeds’
(how friends see their timelines) are also curated by Facebook in a way to make those
friends seem as attractive as possible to like-minded people;33 and direct searching for
news, yet again algorithmically curated by Facebook. 
All of  this is designed to help users find the kind of  stories they want to read – and
there is empirical evidence to suggest that this can lead directly to the spread of  fake
news. This is Kahan: ‘[a] considerable body of  research concludes that people’s cultural
and political predispositions are the source, not the outcome, of  the information they
consume. Identity protection, not correction, is their goal . . . armed with evidence,
people are less vulnerable to succumb to opposing arguments’.34 On social media people
want to bolster their positions, not to find the truth – and to ‘prove’ that they are in the
right. Both Kahan and Pennycook and Rand also suggest that more analytical or numerate
people are in some ways both particularly vulnerable to fake news and particularly likely
to find it (using the various tools provided by Facebook and others) and hence spread it.
This is Pennycook and Rand:
. . . the disposition to think analytically leads people to use deliberative reasoning
to justify their prior beliefs and protect their political (or otherwise) identity.35
This is Kahan:
. . . the more numerate people are even more likely than the least numerate ones
to construe such evidence as supporting the factual beliefs that prevail among
people who share their political identity no matter what its true import.36
That is, numerate and analytically minded people will have both the propensity to believe
news supporting their beliefs (whether it is ‘real’ or ‘fake’ news) and have the ability to
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<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046603>.
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find it and use it in a logical way to ‘win’ arguments. ‘Winning’ arguments is one of  the
keys to political interactions on social media – and Facebook and Twitter in particular.
Moreover, there is a strong community of  numerate and analytically minded people on
the internet, and in particular amongst those very active on social media: the role of  the
gaming and hacking communities and others with a strong interest in computing is one
of  critical importance. The popularity of  conspiracy theories, for example, in many areas
of  the internet, fits well with this observation. Rational arguments can be constructed for
some of  the most bizarre of  ideas – and ‘evidence’ found easily and quickly to support
it. That evidence then spreads, as do the ‘news’ stories themselves.
Facebook aids and abets the spread of  fake news through its basic principles – data-
mining and analysis, profiling, personalising, targeting and the encouragement of  sharing
are all direct supporters of  the spread of  fake news and the bolstering of  fake narratives.
It is through Facebook’s basic systems that fake news has become a qualitatively different
and quantitatively more significant problem – not just through the actions of  rogue actors
who can be hunted down and removed. Those who spread fake news on Facebook are
the ordinary users, and for a wide variety of  reasons. Many, and perhaps most, of  those
reasons are nothing to do with conspiracies or an attempt to undermine the truth or the
political system: people are simply sharing stories that interest them or that they think are
important. They may share them maliciously – but they may also share them just because
they want to keep their ‘friends’ and other connections informed. They may want to help
people to see what they consider the truth – or to help them in their arguments with their
‘opponents’ – conservatives arming other conservatives for their battles with liberals; and
liberals arming other liberals for their battles with conservatives. It is part of  the
polarisation process – and the social media, and Facebook in particular, is perfectly
designed to help it to happen.37
2.5 FACEBOOK AND POLITICS
That social media is well suited for ‘real world’ politics might have come as a bit of  a
surprise to some of  the early adopters of  the internet – John Perry Barlow’s 1996
Declaration of  Independence of  Cyberspace38 asserted that ‘old world’ politics had
neither the place nor the power to have any influence over the internet. Many believed
him then and some still believe him now – but the influence of  politics over the internet
and the ability for ‘real world’ politicians and political movements to use the internet for
their own purposes has become all too clear in recent years. This is particularly true for
the social media – and both the politicians and the social media companies have seen this
as a great opportunity and seized it with both hands.
Social media gives politicians a chance to reach and influence their supporters and
potential voters – and increasingly as an analytical tool to understand and target those
potential voters. The social media companies see it as an opportunity to make money. As
Kreiss and McGregor note in their detailed analysis of  how the technology firms worked
during the 2016 US presidential election:
. . . the growth of  their work in electoral politics was driven by the desire for
direct revenues from their services and products, for candidates to give their
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services and platforms greater public visibility, and to establish relationships with
legislators.39
It is at least on the surface a mutually beneficial relationship – but one with consequences.
Politicians use the analytical tools and immense amount of  data available in order to shape
their campaigns – paying the technology companies for the opportunity. The technology
companies go much further, in working with the political campaigns directly. They have
developed specifically partisan teams to do so. This is Kreiss and McGregor again:
Microsoft, Google, Twitter, and Facebook all came to adopt and currently have
organizational structures and staffing patterns that are organized along partisan
lines. These firms have partisan teams, often made up of  practitioners with
backgrounds in Democratic and Republican politics, which work with campaigns
and parties of  the same political affiliation.
This is more than just letting politicians use the services and systems: it is actively
encouraging them to do so, developing products and services specifically to help them.
On the surface this does not necessarily seem to be a problem – it could look as a positive
contribution to democratic processes. As recent events in politics – notably the Brexit
referendum and the election of  Donald Trump – have shown, the relationship between
politics and truth is often troublesome. The use of  Facebook and other social media, with
their polarising effects and possibilities for fake news and other misinformation, brings
this particularly into focus. Having partisan teams driving further uses of  social media for
politics brings these negative possibilities out even further. 
What is abundantly clear is that Facebook, Twitter and other forms of  social media
are now part of  the political sphere. Politics does happen on the social media – and this is
not a genie that can be easily coaxed back into its bottle. That means that all those who
want to be involved in political activities will look at the possibilities – including those
who wish to use fake news for these purposes. Boundaries can be and are blurred between
what counts as political and what does not. When does an individual sharing an opinion
or spreading a new story (real or fake) become a political act? Campaigning groups of
various kinds all use the social media – and Facebook in particular – in similar ways to
direct and official political campaigns. Tools developed for the ‘real’ politicians can easily
be used by the various shades of  grey between them and the worst of  the political
manipulators. There is a financial incentive to the social media companies not only to
develop those tools but to develop the markets for those tools. This is just one of  the
ways that they make money from fake news and related forms of  misinformation: it is an
incentive that is not going to easily disappear.
2.6 FACEBOOK, FAKE NEWS AND THE TRADITIONAL MEDIA
At one level, the traditional media seeks to portray itself  as providing the ‘real’ news, as
opposed to the fake stuff  to be found on the internet. At another level, it has played its
part in misinformation and disinformation campaigns throughout the ages – Fontane
worked for the mainstream media in Germany, for example, whilst in the UK the print
media is notably and unashamedly partisan and has pushed fake narratives and attempted
to influence politics on a significant scale. Whilst the broadcast media in the UK is
required by law to present its news with ‘due impartiality’ and ‘due accuracy’,40 the extent
Fakebook: why Facebook makes the fake news problem inevitable
39   Daniel Kreiss and Shannon McGregor, ‘Technology firms shape political communication: the work of
Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and Google with campaigns during the 2016 US presidential cycle’ (2018) 35(2)
Political Communication 155–77 dos: 10.1080/10584609.2017.1364814.
40   The Ofcom Broadcasting Code, s 5 <www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-
codes/broadcast-code/section-five-due-impartiality-accuracy>. 
525
to which it achieves that is often open to question. In a content analysis in 2013, the
BBC’s coverage of  politics was shown to be dominated by the ruling party’s voices.41
Certain particular topics were framed in ways that could be seen as distinctly partial:
coverage of  the UK’s relationship to Europe was ‘frequently framed as a problem’ whilst
the debate over immigration was ‘framed by politicians, whose statements were often
presented as “facts”’.42 In both of  these areas, this plays directly into the arguably fake
narratives pushed by the partisan print media.
The relationship between the traditional media and the social media is similarly not
simple: the two are not separate and offering alternatives, but intrinsically and inextricably
interlinked. The traditional media uses the social media as a way to reach its audience, with
pages on Facebook not just for the media operations themselves but for the individual
programmes and journalists. It is a rare journalist that does not have a presence on
Facebook and an active Twitter account. Links to key stories are posted on Facebook and
Twitter, images of  front pages sent around and much more. Traffic is driven to the
websites of  the relevant news sources, potentially providing advertising revenue for the
media. The social media similarly benefits through traffic and advertising revenues, as well
as through the data gathered and profiling made possible through the users’ access to
news sources. Potentially even more importantly, Facebook gains by becoming even more
the place to go on the internet: not just for sharing family photographs and a few personal
stories, but for news, for politics and more. Facebook becomes part of  the infrastructure
for everyone.
For the news media it is a feedback loop. If  Facebook is the most important way
people consume news media, then the media must be on Facebook, which makes
Facebook the best place to consume news media. Though that might seem to be mutually
beneficial, there are a number of  potentially negative consequences for the news media.
It creates a dependency, which puts the news media in a position of  weakness in relation
to Facebook. Facebook can change how it deals with the media – terms and conditions,
how it curates news and so forth – and there is very little that the news media can do
about it. It also means that the more that news media is consumed through Facebook, the
more Facebook takes the advertising revenue from news consumption. Thirdly, news
stories can be spread individually and selectively, meaning that the news media editorial
teams have less control, and news can be seen and shared out of  context, making it easier
for others to manipulate how news is consumed, to use it to shape their own narratives.
The narratives may be the most important point. A fake narrative may be more
damaging than fake news – and this is another key angle to the relationship between the
traditional and social media worlds. Narratives created by the traditional media can be fed
and fostered in the social media – and form the basis for fake news that uses both the
stories in the traditional media and purely invented material, further feeding the
narratives. In its turn, the traditional media feeds off  the social media, using it as sources
and attempting to harness its power. It is a kind of  symbiotic relationship, though which
is the more parasitic of  the partners is sometimes hard to tell.
For specific pieces of  fake news there are legal and regulatory mechanisms in place
for the traditional media – in the UK, including the self-regulation of  the press via the
Independent Press Standards Organisation and IMPRESS and the statutory regulation of
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the broadcast media through Ofcom and the Communications Act 2003. Errors can be
‘corrected’ – though the form of  the correction is often far less prominent than the
original story. Corrections to false stories in the media are even less likely to have an effect
through Facebook and the rest of  the social media: the corrections will not be spread as
the original stories were and will not be found by those looking for confirmation of  their
prejudices and as support for their arguments, rendering this kind of  way of  dealing with
problematic – and effectively fake – news almost entirely ineffective for those who access
their news through social media. 
3 Solutions and conclusions
Many of  the legal and regulatory solutions offered to the fake news problems in the new
environment are direct descendants of  ideas that existed in the old environment: fact-
checking; complaints mechanisms; obligations on ‘platforms’ to check and remove fake
news. Laws against fake news have existed in many places for a very long time indeed: in
England, the First Statute of  Westminster in 1275 included ‘none be so hardy to tell or
publish any false news or tales, whereby discord, or occasion of  discord or slander may
grow between the King and his people, or the great men of  the realm’.43 That statute laid
the responsibility on the person who ‘was the first author of  the tale’ – and to an extent
the same pressure is still being suggested today. Creators of  fake news are to be rooted
out – and the responsibility, both legal and in how much of  the debate is being framed,
placed upon them. ‘Russian trolls’ or Macedonian teenagers are suggested as the basis of
the problem – and there are creators of  fake news who do fit that stereotype. Pressure is
put on the social media companies both to ban these kinds of  creators and to take down
the news that they create.
3.1 PROBLEMATIC SOLUTIONS
There are a number of  immediate problems with this kind of  solution. The first is
locating these creators – though not insoluble, it is not necessarily easy. The second is that
there is no shortage of  people like this. Shut down one and another will immediately take
their place. Those who benefit from the results of  the disinformation will simply get
others to do the job. It is easy to do, quick and relatively cheap at all stages – from the
creation of  identities to the building of  website and Facebook pages. In the past, printing
a pamphlet required a bulky printing press, and distributing that pamphlet required a
network of  trusted individuals. Presses could be found and smashed, networks infiltrated
and key members arrested or worse. Now there are few such problems: the mass of  the
population of  most nations have sufficient technology (a PC or a smartphone) to produce
fake news, whilst distribution is largely automatic. The people who share fake news are
not part of  a secret conspiracy, they are just using social media as it is intended to be used:
sharing links and stories, engaging in political debate and so forth.
Addressing fake news at its source is therefore, though useful in some ways, unlikely
to do more than scratch at the surface of  the problem – and is likely to have unforeseen
consequences that may cause more problems than they solve. Governments can – and
already seem to be – use dealing with fake news as a way to introduce censorship and to
silence dissent or opposition.44 Enemies of  a particular perspective will use the weapons
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created to fight such fake news to shut down or undermine their opponents: the way that
Donald Trump labels the people in the mainstream media who oppose him as ‘fake news’
is just one example.45 In trolling ‘flame wars’ it is a common tactic: trolls report their
victims as trolls as a way to getting them banned or entangled in regulatory messes. The
same will be true of  any mechanisms put forward to tackle fake news in this way. 
Labelling potential fake news as unreliable is unlikely to help either. Highlighting
potentially untrustworthy headlines may make them more likely to be read, and as noted
above46 even reading a headline makes people more likely to believe it. Facebook
abandoned its ‘fake news labelling’ system in December 2017, noting:
Academic research on correcting misinformation has shown that putting a strong
image, like a red flag, next to an article may actually entrench deeply held beliefs
– the opposite effect to what we intended.47
Instead Facebook put in place a ‘related stories’ system, trying to put particular news into
context – but again it is hard to see how this will have any significant impact. Facebook
cites its own research that doing so produces ‘fewer shares’, but that does not say anything
except that it is less damaging than the labelling system. Moreover, it gives another route
for fake news creators to approach: spread variants of  the same story and they can all be
put in place by Facebook’s ‘related stories’ system, making it look even more as though
there is a big underlying story supporting their narrative.
Other proposed solutions to the fake news problems will suffer similar fates. The idea
that Facebook or Google should use artificial intelligence (AI) to detect fake news, then
use their algorithms to demote it in their search results or news feeds, making it less
prominent,48 is attractive on the surface, but is also flawed. As Anjana Susarla notes,
‘[d]espite some basic potential flaws, AI can be a useful tool for spotting online
propaganda – but it can also be startlingly good at creating misleading material’.49 Susarla
goes on to say, ‘using AI to detect fake news . . . puts technology in an arms race with
itself ’. The creators and spreaders of  fake news learn the tactics and methods of  those
trying to block them, then turn those tactics on their heads, designing news that will not
only beat the ‘fake news detectors’ but get their own news to the top of  the pile.
Algorithms can be and are gamed in this way in other contexts – the search engine
optimisation industry works in precisely this way – and the kind of  people wishing to
spread fake news tend to have exactly the kinds of  skills to do this, or the resources to
employ those who do. In a technological arms race, ‘truth’ is highly unlikely to be a
winner. When Facebook, facing criticism from conservatives that its ‘trending news team’
of  human editors was biased against them, fired the human editors in 2016 and let the
algorithms do the work: the result was predictably bad, with fake news rising right to the
top.50 Two years later, Facebook abandoned its trending news project entirely.51
All this, however, is missing the key point. It is the very nature of  the way that social
media, and Facebook in particular, enables fake news and related misinformation to have its
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effect. If  specific fake news is stopped – which in itself  is highly unlikely – it will not stop
the spreading of  fake narratives, the construction of  further fake news, and the use of
individual ‘true’ stories out of  context to manipulate and obscure. Truth, insofar as it is
possible to identify, becomes lost in the spreading morass of  stories, shaped and crafted both
by malicious individuals and by unknowing groups coming together to support their beliefs.
What methods could actually work are another matter. Whilst Facebook and similar
mechanisms are used as a primary source of  news it is hard to see how – and it is
important to recognise that though Facebook is the most prominent, it is far from the
only network or system involved. Twitter is used to spread stories, Instagram to illustrate
them, and YouTube to provide ‘evidence’ – the way that ‘false flag’ and similar stories
were spread through YouTube and via Google immediately after the 2017 shootings in
Las Vegas and Texas are cases in point.52 YouTube is a key location for conspiracy
theorists: there is a large community of  ‘flat-earthers’, for example.53 They all have the
same symptoms: ease of  creation, algorithmic curation, community ‘sharing’ and
targeting. Again, it is not just that fake news will always find an audience, but that the
audience will always find fake news.
3.2 FAKEBOOK
None of  this should be very surprising. Truth was never a key point for Facebook. It was
born from the idea of  presenting yourself  in positive ways – the college ‘facebook’ was
always much more about making an impression than in revealing an underlying truth. Its
business essence is about advertising – and truth has never been the key to advertising
either. What is more, Facebook’s advertising model is based on data-mining, profiling and
targeting, three things that underpin the effective creation and distribution of  fake news,
both for political manipulation and for financial gain. Facebook’s attraction to users is
based on sharing, and on finding people with common interests – two more keys to the
effectiveness of  fake news, fake narratives and related forms of  misinformation. Unless
Facebook breaks both its business model for advertisers and its attraction for users,
therefore, it will remain not just ripe territory and a magnet for fake news, but will actively
aid in both the generation and spread of  this news.
Facebook has no particular interest in truth. If  spreading true stories makes Facebook
money, or being known for truthfulness makes it money, then it will do both. If  spreading
fake news or other forms of  misinformation (or allowing that fake news or
misinformation to be spread) makes Facebook more money, then it is its interest to do
that. More importantly, if  measures that might actually have an impact on the spreading
of  fake news, or other political manipulation, would mean Facebook made less money,
then it would be in its interest not to take those measures. The evidence so far suggests
both of  these are true. That is, allowing fake news and political misinformation makes it
more money than focusing on the truth.
Whether anything can realistically be done to reduce the political impact of  fake news
and related misinformation in the social media era is another matter. There are some
possible approaches that might have some impact. Reducing the amount that people get
news from Facebook and similar sources might be a key. There are some signs this might
be happening: there are indications that people are looking for different sources. Reuters
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reports a rise in the use of  messaging applications for news54 – and where those
applications use encryption this could reduce both the level of  surveillance and of
gaming of  news. It will not, however, reduce the network and polarisation effects, the
automatic spreading of  fake news and so forth. Further, as Reuters also notes, Facebook
‘dominates both social networking and messaging’ – owning both Whatsapp and
Messenger, the two most popular messaging apps.
That might provide part of  the answer. Reducing dependency on a particular source,
supporting rather than undermining encryption, limiting data-sharing and data-mining to
make profiling and targeting harder, as well as a significant effort into public awareness of
the role that the social media plays in the spread of  fake news and other misinformation
could be part of  a way forward. All that does not seem likely to make a significant
difference so long as we as a culture continue our embrace of  systems like Facebook.
Whilst we do so, fake news will remain an inevitable problem – and a problem that is likely
to increase. The question is whether the benefits of  our embracing social media – to
freedom of  expression in particular – make it a problem that is worth living with.
At every age, technological developments have brought advances in freedom of
speech – and at the same time allowed or supported damaging uses of  that freedom of
speech. It was true for the pamphleteers, the newspapers, for radio and television – and
it is true for Facebook and other social media now. Whilst there is money to be made –
both by the fake news providers and by Facebook – and whilst there’s political gain to be
made by those who desire it, there is no reason to believe that the problems caused by
fake news will lessen, and many reasons to believe that they will continue. Facebook’s
business model ensures that the first will remain true, whilst human and political nature
mean that the latter will never go away. It is not possible to find a ‘clean’ solution. Instead,
messy, imperfect ways ahead may be the best way forward. This is not a problem that is
going to go away any time soon.
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